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1. The concept of legal hysteresis.
A recent judgement of the High Court of Justice in matter of private copy exception [1] provides the twofold prime
opportunity to shed light on the state of the art of copyright in the UK and to flesh out the idea of ‘legal hysteresis’,
which I have sketched elsewhere [2].
Proceeding in reverse order, hysteresis (from the ancient Greek ‘ στ ρησις’, coming late, but also lack, privation) is a
polysemous concept originally proper to physics and then transplanted to other fields such as cytology, ethnography
and economics [3]. Broadly understood, hysteresis is the characteristic of a system whereby there is a delay in the
response to stresses as an effect of the previous status of the relevant system [4]. By legal hysteresis I mean the fact
that the development of law is slowed down by existing laws and regulations, therefore, especially when it comes to
new technologies, statutes and regulations are obsolete even in the moment itself when they come into force. The
situation is worsened in the legal systems characterised by never-ending granular negotiations with stakeholders and
by lobbying [5].
There is increasing conscience of this problem, as emerges for instance [6] from the annual report of the Italy Data
Protection Authority (Garante per la protezione dei dati personali , henceforth ‘Garante’), [7] insofar as the Garante
observes that the revision of the security measures provided by the technical specifications attached to the code of
privacy cannot be any more delayed, for the relevant provisions are obsolete (‘only’ ten years have passed), being
changed the technological context [8].
The present occasion regards the Copyright and Rights in Performances (Personal Copies for Private Use)
Regulations 2014, and the private copy exception under the Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988 (hereafter
‘CDPA’). However, the examples are utterly umpteen.
One need only think to the directive 2011/83/UE (so-called consumer rights directive, henceforth CRD) [9], insofar as
it refers to digital content in CDs and DVDs [10] without mentioning all the new tangible media for such contents (such
as smartphones [11], wearables, etc.), let alone the intangible media based on cloud computing technologies [12].
In fact, a good example is provided by laws applicable to cloud computing, which assume ‘one-to-one relationships
not one-to-many, dedicated not shared infrastructure, and controllers’ absolute control over processors who process
data actively for controllers, instead of renting out self-service resources’ [13]. As more recently noted, “regulators
seem to ‘discriminate’ against cloud, for whatever reason: if a controller rents a computer from a rental company to
process personal data, the rental company is not considered a “processor”; but, if a controller uses a cloud service to
perform the same processing, the cloud provider is considered a “processor”, with attendant data protection law
requirements” [14]. Similar considerations apply, just to name a few, to the Internet of Things, machine learning,
artificial intelligence, artificial enhancement, drones, and robots.
Nor legacy problems are confined to the law traditionally understood. Technology lawyers know very well that it is not
rare to read contracts that are clearly tailored for past realities (for instance, outsourcing contracts used for the
provision of cloud computing services) [15].
One of the consequences of legal hysteresis is private ordering. By ‘private ordering’ neither I mean here the
spontaneous enforcement of agreements (usually due to the so-called reputational mechanism), nor (better, not only)
are we referring to the abuse of contracts in order to elude the law [16]. I mean that, as a response to a legislator that
intervenes always too late, there are a lot of regulating gaps when it comes to technology and these gaps are filled by
the contracts [17].
In order to avert this infinite chase, in the last decades the majority of the stakeholders of the technology-related
sectors has increasingly been suggesting to avoid hard law and ad hoc measures in favour of soft law, self and co-
regulation initiatives, codes of practice, and the like. More generally, it has become a quite common view that one
ought not to approve “the law of the horse”, [18] whereas the existing principles are flexible enough to accommodate
the new reality. I am not sure that this is always (and still) the case, but it is indeed a matter of striking a balance
between legal certainty and democracy, on the one hand, and efficiency and legal creativity, on the other hand. At any
rate, until the legislators will not take a stand, courts, corporations, and other public and private stakeholders will
retain the upper hand over the technological order.
2. The Infosoc Directive: negotiation and implementation.
The Infosoc Directive allows the Member States to introduce exceptions and limitations to copyright [19]. Namely,
under Article 5(2)b Member States can provide for exceptions or limitations to the reproduction right “in respect of
reproductions on any medium made by a natural person for private use and for ends that are neither directly nor
indirectly commercial, on condition that the right holders receive fair compensation which takes account of the
application or non-application of technological measures referred to in Article 6 to the work or subject-matter
concerned.” [20] It has been recognised that this exception can only be limited subject to the conditions specified
thereof, therefore these conditions not being satisfied, the consumer who has acquired a DVD and cannot make a
copy for private use on videocassette because of technical protection measures (TPM) has suffered a loss [21].
On a national level, all the Member States have introduced a private copy exception, with approaches to
implementation that have varied, with reportedly [22] 21 out of 28 Member States having levies in place to ensure fair
compensation for rights holders [23].
During negotiations on the Infosoc Directive, the UK Government’s approach was conservative inasmuch it sought to
maintain existing UK exceptions as far as possible [24]. The Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003, thus,
amended the existing exceptions where required to comply with the Directive, but in general they did not introduce
new exceptions [25]. As to the private copy and photocopy exceptions, particularly, it was indeed clear since the very
beginning that “There will be no UK implementation. There is a private sector licensing scheme covering much
published material, which may be thought to meet the need reflected in these exceptions.” [26] This was also the
result of the pressures exerted by the lobbies of the sectors involved (music, books, etc.). For instance, the British
Phonographic Industry suggested that only the compulsory exceptions in the Directive should be implemented and
that “all of the 5.2(b) restrictions on exceptions must be implemented, and that existing private use exemptions must
not be extended.” [27]
3. The Copyright and Rights in Performance (Personal Copies for Private Use) Regulations 2014.
As far as I know, the only private copy exception existing in the UK is broadcast time-shifting (sec. 70(1) of the CDPA).
A recording of a broadcast can be made in domestic premises for private and domestic use to enable it to be viewed
or listened to at a more convenient time [28]. This is unique peculiarity, as “All member states – with the exception of
the UK and Ireland – thereby provide for an exception which is identical to the core regulatory concept under Article
5(2)b” [29], let alone the more public interest-oriented states where the exception applies to all acts of private copying
remains in place, only subject to the condition that the purpose must be for personal use [30]. This situation was
particularly intolerable, given that the private copy appears the most important exception, if only one think of the
European relevant case law [31] and of the mediation process carried out by António Vitorino [32].
With a notable delay, if compared with other Member States,[33] on 1.6.2014 the UK implemented art. 5(2)b of the
Infosoc Directive by introducing a limited private copy exception. The Copyright and Rights in Performance (Personal
Copies for Private Use) Regulations 2014 provided an exception limited to the personal use, to the owners of a
personal copy and with the exclusion of the even indirectly commercial uses. No compensation was provided.
Computer programs had been left out as existing provisions made under the Software Directive [34] already allow
back-up copies of software [35]. Thus, the UK rendered legal what the society perceived as absolutely commonplace
activities (facilitated by a large number of technologies whose essence is some form of copying).
Let us analyse closer the then introduced section 28A (Personal copies for private use) of the CDPA [36], which
constitutes the output of a process of consultation and debate with all the stakeholders involved that lasted nearly 3
years and saw the Government doing approximately 150 ad hoc meetings.
To understand the provision, one can divide it into object, subject, and purpose.
The non-infringing copy is a copy of the individual’s own copy of the work, or a personal copy of the work made by the
individual. To qualify as “the individual’s own copy” the copy must have been lawfully [37] acquired by the individual on
a permanent basis. The said basis includes a copy which has been purchased, obtained by way of a gift, or acquired
by means of a download resulting from a purchase or a gift, and does not include a copy which has been borrowed,
rented, broadcast or streamed, or a copy which has been obtained by means of a download enabling no more than
temporary access to the copy.
As regards the subject, copyright is infringed if an individual transfers a personal copy of the work to another person
such as a family member (otherwise than on a private and temporary basis), except where the transfer is authorised
by the copyright owner. Obviously, one can sell for instance the CD he has lawfully acquired (property prevails on
copyright), but after the transfer they are not allowed any more to retain any personal copy and must therefore destroy
them.
The purpose is equally critical. The dealing is fair only for for the individual’s private use, and for ends which are
neither directly nor indirectly commercial. This includes essentially the making of back-up copies, format-shifting,
storage, including cloud storage [38].
Lastly, two provisions are relevant insofar as they show that the private copy exception is expression of a public
interest.
On the one hand, under subsection subsec. 10 of sec. 28A “To the extent that a term of a contract purports to prevent
or restrict the making of a copy which, by virtue of this section, would not infringe copyright, that term is
unenforceable.” Freedom of contract, which is a cornerstone of liberal private law, [39] yields to the freedom of
expression, because copying is recognising as a fundamental step of the creation process.
On the other hand, section 296ZEA provides a remedy [40] for the case where an individual is prevented from making
a personal copy of a copyright work, or is restricted in the number of personal copies of it which may be made,
because of a restrictive measure applied by or on behalf of the copyright owner. The reference is to the TPMs [41]. In
my opinion, TPMs and more generally the solutions of “enforcement by design” run counter the contextual and
contingent nature of the law, which in copyright law expresses itself in the necessity to assess fairness case by case
and striking a balance between the private and public interested involved.
4. The new framework of exceptions and limitations in the UK.
The Copyright and Rights in Performance (Personal Copies for Private Use) Regulations 2014 is one of the five
instruments that have introduced the new framework of exceptions and limitations to copyright in the UK. Alongside
the above analysed regulations, the Government has introduces regulations as to research, education, libraries and
archives; [42] quotation, parody, and pastiche; [43] disability; [44] and public administration.[45] This constitutes the
culmination of the process started thanks to the publication of Professor Ian Hargreaves’s independent report (so-
called Hargreaves Review) [46], where it has been recognised that “Copyright exceptions are designed to allow uses
of content that offer benefits deemed either more important than those delivered by the core aims of copyright  and/or
benefits that do not significantly detract from those aims.” [47] Professor Hargreaves recommendations have been
accepted by the Government [48] which committed itself to extend it as far as possible within the confines of the EU
copyright framework, moving from the assumption that “Where society (…) acknowledges in practice that the
enforcement of rights is uneconomic or unreasonable, for example over private copying, these should ideally be taken
out of scope of the IP system.” Following the “Consultation on proposals to change the UK’s copyright system” (closed
in March 2012), further informal consultation, and the blessing of the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee and of
the Regulatory Policy Committee, in December 2012 the Government published its final policy “Modernising
Copyright: a modern, robust and flexible framework”. In a written ministerial statement, on 20.12.2012, the Secretary
of State for Business, Innovation and Skills announced the Government’s intention to make changes to the copyright
exceptions framework in order to achieve “strong, sustainable and balanced growth.” [49]
The new framework is as follows. [50]
Caricature, Parody or Pastiche. As bizarre as in may be, given the importance of the sense of humour in English
society, until the 1.10.2014 in the UK it was illegal to deal with a copyright work for purposes of caricature, parody, or
pastiche. Now it is legal, but only if the dealing is fair, therefore for instance use of a few lines of song for a parody
sketch is likely to be considered fair, whereas use of a whole song is not. [51]
Quotation. Before the newly enacted regulations, one could quote only for the purpose of criticism, review or news
reporting. Not it is allowed to do it for any purpose as long as it is fair dealing.
Research and private study. Institutions such as libraries and universities can offer access to sound recordings, films
and broadcasts on the premises at electronic terminals, if purpose is not commercial and the copying is fair and
reasonable (e.g. not a whole DVD).
Text and data mining. Whether for non-commercial research, it is allowed to copy materials for the technical process
of data mining, that is computer-based analysis of copyright material.
Education and teaching. One can now make a more extensive use of materials in conjunction with educational
licensing schemes; minor acts of copying for teaching purposes are legal.
Archiving and preservation. Institutions such as libraries, archives, museums and galleries are able to make copies of
all types of creative works in their collections, in order to preserve them.
Public administration. Public bodies can share some third party copyright material online, such as material submitted
by an individual or business for the purpose of maintaining a public register.
Accessible formats for disabled people. Individuals can make a single copy of copyright works in accessible formats
for the personal use of a disabled person. Charities can make multiple copies of copyright protected works for disabled
people [52].
As one can read in the Explanatory Memorandum, the Government has thus expanded the freedoms in copyright law
for a variety of economically and socially valuable purposes. The changes, however, contain safeguards “to ensure
that a reasonable balance is maintained between the interests of creators, owners, performers, consumers and users
of copyright works.”[53]
5. The unnecessary compensation and pricing-in theory: empirical evidence.
I have mentioned that no ad hoc compensation scheme was provided by the private copy regulations. The
Hargreaves Review – on which there has been a triennial consultation – pointed out that the UK has a thriving market
for personal media devices which rely on private copying and that there is no economic argument for adding an extra
charge to these devices in order to authorise reasonable private acts which are part of the normal use of devices. In
fact, whereas there is no evidence of harm to rights holders done by this kind of private copying in the normal course
of using digital equipment to play works, “There is considerable evidence of overall public benefits from consumer
use.”[54] As rights holders are well aware of consumers’ behaviour the benefit of being able to copy “is already
factored into the price that rights holders are charging.” [55]
During the consultation, the copyright owners were the only ones to feel “that a private copying exception of any type
or scope would cause them unreasonable harm (…) the Government should therefore apply a levy, licence or tax to
copying devices in order to compensate for this harm.”[56] In fact, the Government was convinced that the private
copy exception “causes minimal or no harm to copyright owners” [57] inasmuch as the exception was limited to
people who already owned a lawful copy of a work (which meant that the ability to make personal copies can be
factored in at the point of sale).
There is empirical evidence of this phenomenon [58]. Indeed when music downloads that could be copied freely for
personal non-commercial use were first introduced they were sold at higher prices than the DRM-protected
equivalents.[59] And also after the dropping of the DRM-free download prices to the same price as DRM-protected
copies, still more units were sold. An IPO commissioned independent research [60] based on a comparison of prices
of copies of different media sold under different usage restrictions. This research appears to confirm that pricing-in is
possible, and is taking place. Another approach is to look at impacts on consumer demand and sales of copies.
Without format shifting, it is becoming increasingly difficult to play CDs on portable devices, as MP3 players and
mobile phones are widespread, and demand for portable CD players declines. This suggests that many people buying
CDs do so with the expectation that they will format shift in order to play their CDs on a portable device, and that sales
of CDs (and prices) would be lower if they could not do this. Another way to examine the consistency of the pricing-in
theory is to compare the price of an average digital download album and the price of an average CD album: average
CD prices are higher than MP3 download prices, not only because the manufacturing costs are higher, but also
because CD copying is widely considered to reasonable and takes place regardless of copyright. Therefore, the value
of being able to make private copies from CDs is likely to already be factored into the market.
Consequently, the Government took the stand that
levies or other compensation are neither required nor desirable in the context of a narrow provision that causes
minimal harm. Levies are an unnecessary and inefficient tax on consumers. They are unfair to consumers in that they
are payable regardless of the use to which a levied device (for example a hard disk) is put and regardless of whether
a user has already paid for the copies they store on a device. Furthermore, particularly in the current economic
climate, it is not right to extract more money from the pockets of hard pressed consumers.” [61]
Similar considerations apply to cloud storage, given the technology neutrality principle. The Government notes that
the removal of the ability of copyright owners to license certain types of cloud storage would not cause them a
significant loss of income, because
All or most cloud services that currently exist in the market and are licensed by rights holders will still require licences
following introduction of the exception. Any loss of licensing income is therefore unlikely to be significant” [62]
Moreover, this removal would reduce barriers to entry and enhance competition in this market, supporting
technological innovation and economic growth.
6. British Academy of Songwriters, Composers and Authors and others, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary
of State for Business, Innovation and Skills.
Notwithstanding the long process of consultation and all the empirical evidence gathered, the British Academy of
Songwriters, Composers and Authors (BASCA), the Musicians’ Union, and UK Music still found that this narrow [63]
exception harmed their interests; therefore, they brought an application for judicial review and surprisingly succeeded.
More precisely, on 19.6.2015 the High Court of Justice ruled only one issue (the fourth) in favour of the claimants, [64]
that was
The submission that the decision was flawed because the evidence relied upon to justify the conclusion about harm
was inadequate/manifestly inadequate: This submission focuses upon the Secretary of State’s conclusion that the
exception would lead to minimal or zero harm when the evidence relied upon does not support that conclusion”
At to this issue, Mr Justice Green decides in favour of the claimants
“because the conclusions and inferences which have been drawn from the evidence the Secretary of State has relied
upon are simply not warranted or justified by that evidence. This is a conclusion I would arrive at on the basis of any
test for judicial review; it is not as such dependent upon the review being intensive or merits based”
Being the parties’ submissions the following step, Mr Justice Green clarifies that the judgement does not necessarily
result in section 28A CDPA being struck down.
It is, in theory, possible for the Secretary of State to re-investigate the issue in order to address the evidential gap
which now prevails. If he does this then one possible outcome would be that the gap that I have identified is plugged
and the present decision becomes justified. Another outcome might be that following further investigation the gap in
the evidence remains un-plugged in which case the Secretary of State could either repeal section 28B or introduce a
compensation scheme. A third possibility is that the Secretary of State simply decides to introduce a compensation
scheme without more.”
Before analysing the conclusions after the parties’ submissions, let us touch on the reasoning as to the fourth issue.
Now, it is true that the defendant’s discretion in drawing conclusions from the evidence gathered is someway fettered
by the fact that he is only permitted to avoid the introduction of a compensation scheme if the harm caused by the
introduction of the copyright exception is de minimis or zero. But if one reads Mr Justice Green’s judgement, they may
have the impression that the judge would not accept the no harm claim if the pricing-in practice was not proved and
effective beyond a shadow of a doubt, thus mixing different issues. Indeed, he states that
It is therefore no answer to this question to say that economic common sense suggests that “ to some extent” pricing-
in will obviate harm. That perfectly sensible conclusion might go some way to answering the requisite legal question
but it does not go all the way. For example, if “to some extent” means that 60% of harm is obviated by pricing-in then
unless the residual 40% can be treated in law as de minimis then economic intuition is not enough.”
It looks like Mr Justice Green has already come to a decision when he dismisses the empirical evidence as to the
higher price of non-DRM downloads as a mere ‘incident’, but, as to other empirical data, it is nevertheless true that
the Government might have moved from a sounder evidence. For instance, the Secretary of State had pointed out
“one approach to research could be to examine the impact on consumer demand and sales of copies,” however, no
such survey had ever been commissioned. At the same time, I do not find that the High Court’s assumption that from
1.10.2014 on “upon countless occasions, no doubt running into many millions, natural and legal persons performed
acts of copying which were lawful under the law as it then stood” is based on sufficient evidence.
On 17.7.2015, the High Court of Justice has addressed the issues arising out of the judgment handed down on
19.6.2015.[65] As said above, the Secretary of State could have shielded the private copy regulations by reinforcing
the underlying evidence or by introducing a compensation scheme. On the contrary, they have decided not to decide
and, despite the three-year-long consultation process, “take time to reflect before making any further decisions”.
Therefore, in principle [66] Mr Justice Green could not do anything but quashing the private copy regulations
prospectively [67], because there had been “defect in the process by which evidence was collected and evaluated
during the consultation process leading up to the adoption of the Regulations.” Consequently, the Secretary of State
“will now take the opportunity to reflect further and in due course take a view as to whether […] a new private copying
exception should be introduced”. It is not clear why they welcome the guidance that the Court has provided as to the
scope and nature of the factual enquiries which are necessary, but then they want to reflect as to “whether, and in
what form, any further factual enquiries should be carried out.” Moreover, if the Government had defended the private
copy exception, this would have been an ideal occasion to refer to the Court of Justice to clarify the concept of harm.
Unfortunately, “Given that the Secretary of State submits that a quashing order is appropriate at this stage, there is no
necessity for a reference to the CJEU.” [68]
7. The future: Bernard of Chartres, a value-driven view on the private copy exception and a purpose-oriented
interpretation of copyright.
The reasoning of the judge is so that one can expect a different decision in the future, as he does not deny the validity
of the inferences, he questions the solidity of the evidence itself, which we wish the Government will better gather in
order to put an end to the unfortunate predicament where the UK is the only Member State not having the most
important of the exceptions to copyright.
I expect that a new narrow private copy exception will be reintroduced. This time it will be accompanied by a
compensation scheme, not because it is really necessary, but due to the lobbying of the stakeholders involved and as
the Court of Justice has shown to be prone to favour the property reasons in the balance with freedom of expression
and information. In fact, as one can read in Martin Luksan v Petrus van der Let, [69] with reference to the private copy
exception, European Union law must be interpreted as meaning that the right holder (in this case the principal director
of cinematographic work) “must be entitled, by operation of law, directly and originally, to the right to the fair
compensation”.
A reference to the Court of Justice might still be useful and it is not in the least prevented by the BASCA judgement. In
fact, “Nothing that [the High Court has] said in this ruling should be taken as an indication as to the decision that a
future Court might make upon an application by the Claimants (or others) for a reference in the future.”
It ought to be noted that a system of right holder remuneration is not necessary under EU law (the High Court applied
English Common Law). In the so-called Amazon case [70], the Court of Justice has clarified Member States enjoy a
good degree of discretion over compensation systems, as long as a fair balance is struck between rights holders and
users of the exception. If a compensation is introduced, its purpose is to recompense the harm suffered by authors
(Padawan case) [71].
If one analyses in vitro article 5(2)k of the Infosoc Directive, they might get the wrong impression that a compensation
is necessary. A contextual and systematic interpretation of the directive, however, suggests a different scenario. In
fact, under recital 35 no compensation must be provided if the prejudice to the right holder would be minimal and, as
recently stated in the Copydan Båndkopi case, [72] the Member States have ample discretion to decide where the
threshold lies below which prejudice or harm might be classified as “minimal”. In addition, one should wish that the UK
would inspire itself to the virtuous models of Malta, Cyprus and Luxemburg that treat private copying as de minimis
harm. Ideally, the new private copy exception should not be limited to the individual’s use, thus conforming to the vast
majority of Member States’ policies that introduced an exception, which was generally stretched beyond personal
private copying and covered, for instance, copying to family and friends and by way of gifts.
Systematic interpretation today means also to place the normative text in the international context, which confirms [73]
how much public interest and balance are important in copyright law. It is not a case that the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) itself, which is not the most public-spirited existing treaty,
makes clear that
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and
obligations” (art. 7)
The conscience of the ends of copyright is present also in the Infosoc directive, whose goal is to comply “with the
fundamental principles of law and especially of property, including intellectual property, and freedom of expression and
the public interest” (rec. 3) and to “promote learning and culture by protecting works, while permitting exceptions or
limitations in the public interest” (rec. 14)
The US case law can teach us something in this respect. I have already cited the Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
case. The Supreme Court considered a commercial parody involving substantive copying as ‘fair,’ because
exceptions to copyright “have to work [their] way through the relevant factors, and be judged case by case, in light of
the ends of the copyright law.” The ends of the copyright law, useless to say, are creativity, innovation, and freedom of
expression. Now, it is true that the WTO has always sponsored a step-by-step right holders-favourable application of
the three-step test, but nothing in European law prohibits an overall purpose-oriented interpretation of copyright and of
its exceptions.
To conclude, I do not believe that historically copyright was the only way to promote culture and innovation. General
public domain system might have served better this goals. Nonetheless, the advocates of intellectual property have
always used these noble ends to justify proprietary protection of immaterial products. They must be consistent now. If
the ends of copyright are the promotion of culture, free speech, and innovation, then “the law of copyright must allow
prospective authors to ‘stand on the shoulders of giants’ and freely engage in transformative uses. Private copying is
an essential first step in this process of follow-on creation” [74].
The vivid image attributed to Isaac Newton, but coined by the French Neo-Platonist philosopher Bernard of Chartres,
conveys the idea that the Moderns are dwarves perched on the shoulders of the Ancients, and thus they are able to
see more and further. [75] We have to remember that the better vision we have today does not depend (only) on the
acuteness of our sight, but it is because we are elevated by the ideas that have been developed before us, which also
were the result of some sort of copying. In this sense it is correct albeit provocative to say that intellectual property is a
theft.[76] This concepts exports the phrase “la propriété c’est le vol” (attributed to Proudhon, rooted in Brissot’s
thought [77]) to a realm where one does not have to be an anarchist or a Girondist to do such a claim.
In conclusion, I support the reintroduction of the private copy exception, possibly in a less narrow fashion, and I am
confident the expectations will be fulfilled because: i. the judge did not rule on the actual compatibility of UK exception
for personal copies for private use with EU law; ii. The High Court decided the majority of the issues of the BASCA
case in favour of the Secretary State; iii. The ‘no harm’ inference from the evidence gathered has not been
questioned; iv. The UK is the only Member State that does not have such an exception; v. Most Member States have a
private copy exception not limited to the personal use; vi. European case law allows the Member States considerable
room for discretion in assessing the de minimis regime while introducing copyright exceptions; vii. The fact that the
majority of European cases on exceptions and limitations to copyright regard the private copy, jointly interpreted with
the point iv, can be interpreted as a sign of the importance of this exception; viii. Copyright exceptions are the
expression of the very nature of copyright and of its goals; ix. Copying is essential for the creative process; x. Copying
is commonplace and regarded as legal not only by jailbirds, but by reasonable and honest people.
One obstacle to the future process can be the legal hysteresis, which in the UK is not only given to the natural greater
rapidity in the development of technologies if compared to the making of the laws. In the UK, a three-year-long
consultation and evidence-collection process is not sufficient to introduce an exception which exists in all the Member
States (by the by with a broader scope) and which reflects a commonplace activity regarded as legal (or at least as
normal) by most respectable people. A misconception of democracy may worsen hysteresis and jeopardise
democracy itself, which should be first of all about empowering people and being sensitive to the needs arising from
society.
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Universal Pictures video France et al. (so-called DVD II). On the final judgement of the Cour de Cassation, see e.g.
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been introduced by way of the imposition of a levy charged on consumers of blank media (CDs, DVDs, Blu-Ray discs,
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[53] One could infer from the wording that the balance occurs merely between private interests. At a closer look,
however, one recognises many public interests epitomised by the named stakeholders. Yet the linguistic choice is a
sign of commonplace approach to copyright in the UK.
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translation are available at http://gossettphd.org/library/salisbury_metalogicon.pdf , whereas I have consulted the
Latin version Joannis Saresberiensis Postea Episcopi Carnotensis Opera Omnia , ed. by J.A. Giles, V, Oxford, 1848,
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[77] P.-J. Proudhon, Qu’est-ce que la propriété? ou Recherche sur le principe du Droit et du Gouvernement , Paris,
1840, 1-2, writes “Si j’avais à répondre à la question suivante : Qu’est-ce que l’esclavage ? et que d’un seul mot je
répondisse : c’est l’assassinat, ma pensée serait d’abord comprise. Je n’aurais pas besoin d’un long discours pour
montrer que le pouvoir d’ôter à l’homme la pensée, la volonté, la personnalité, est un pouvoir de vie et de mort, et que
faire un homme esclave, c’est l’assassinat. Pourquoi donc à cette autre demande : Qu’est-ce que la propriété ? ne
puis-je répondre de même : c’est le vol, sans avoir la certitude de n’être pas entendu, bien que cette seconde
proposition ne soit que la première transformée?”. I believe that one can hear Brissot’s echo in J.P. Brissot de
Warville, Recherches philosophiques sur le droit de propriété considéré dans la nature, Paris, 1780, 26: “La nature ne
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dans tes maisons, tes meubles,, ton or, tout est à eux: ils sont maitres de tout.”. See also where the Girondist says “la
propriété exclusive est un crime véritable dans la nature… L’Être suprême a donné la terre à tous les homme ” (42);
“Ce n’est pas le malheureux affamé qui mèrite d’être puni; c’est le riche assez barbare pour refuser au besoin de son
semblable, que est digne du supplice. Ce riche est le seul voleur; il devroit seul être suspendu à ces infames gibbets,
qui ne semblent élevé que pour punir l’homme nè dans la misere, d’avoir des besoins; que pour le forcer d’étouffer la
voix de la nature, le cri de la liberté; que pour le contraindre à se jeter dans un dur esclavage, pour éviter une mort
ignominieuse” (109); “Cette propriété civile…n’est pas qu’une usurpation sociale” (110). Emphasis added.
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